“Annus Horribilis”: First Year Balance Sheet of the Second Trump Era

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When Donald Trump marched to power for the second time, he made a clear promise to the nationalist MAGA base. America would turn inward, revive production, get rid of the globalist neocon and Zionist understanding that has put the country in a regime of uninterrupted wars for the last four decades, and thus establish a more balanced power relationship with China. In short, Trump initially decided to part ways with the neocon and Zionist globalist finance-capital world, which challenged the order established by the USA after 1945, especially after the Cold War.

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Theory–Practice Divergence

When we look at the practice at the end of the last year, the picture that emerges reveals a gap between Trump’s theory and practice. Today, Trump has come to a position that is diametrically opposed to his promises. The Trump administration sought to establish an almost unlimited hegemony over North, Central, and South America, which it defined as the Western Hemisphere, and aimed to completely liquidate the influence of Russia and China in this geography. States that deviated from the U.S. line were openly threatened with the use of force; Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Cuba, and even Canada became targets of this repressive approach. The outbursts claiming that Greenland should join the USA, either “of its own accord” or by other means, have been among the most extreme examples of this line.

All these steps show that the discourse of turning inward and seeking balance that Trump advocated during the election period has been effectively abandoned. On the other hand, the past year has witnessed a rare scale of force usage in American history. Trade wars were waged with a harshness far beyond expectations; sanctions and embargoes have ceased to be classical foreign-policy tools and have been transformed into direct weapons. In this process, the U.S. state acted as an instrument of the finance-capital order that controls a global financial volume of approximately 720 trillion dollars, rather than its own national interests. At the same time, the influence of the Zionist structure in the United States—Jewish bankers, media owners, and associated universities and think tanks—on foreign policy and security decisions has become even more visible.

In other words, the first year of the Trump era, in these respects, was recorded as the balance sheet of a harsh, inconsistent, and increasingly aggressive hegemonic practice shaped under the pressures of the global financial order, rather than the promised claim of “making America great again.”

Unlimited Use of Force and the Israelization of the USA

The most obvious break in Trump’s first year was that the use of force abroad was no longer an exception and instead turned into a routine state practice. This practice reflected the doctrine that Israel has applied since 1948. In this context, U.S. support for the Gaza genocide, attacks on Iran, turning a blind eye to Israel’s attack on the Hamas delegation while talks in Qatar were ongoing, the blockade and quarantine imposed on Venezuela, the sinking of Venezuelan civilian boats without warning, the seizure of tankers belonging to the shadow fleet on the high seas, the kidnapping of Maduro, and finally the open threats against Greenland—NATO territory—clearly revealed the gap between Trump’s own promises and his actions.

This picture points to an understanding of the use of force that gains continuity, grows in scale, and expands in geography, rather than being limited to single and isolated raids. The increase in airstrikes is not merely a quantitative leap, but a structural change showing that the military threshold has been deliberately lowered. The use of force is now being decided through shorter decision-making processes, on broader grounds, and across wider areas. While Biden ordered 555 airstrikes during his four-year term, Military Times, based on ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project) data, recorded that Trump ordered 626 airstrikes in a single year.

In short, the U.S. no longer adequately considers legal review and justification while lowering the threshold for conflict. The easy use of naked force, as practiced by Israel, encourages opposing sides to slide into the logic of “easy” retaliation. As in the case of Venezuela, the blurring of legal boundaries under flexible and ambiguous labels such as the “fight against drugs” creates a practical space that erodes international humanitarian law, even when it provides a short-term military advantage. This dynamic shows that not only the USA, but the entire global system has entered a more fragile, more unpredictable, and more conflict-prone phase. In the background of all these developments lie two basic facts. The first is the U.S. debt burden, which has reached unbearable levels and has clogged the debt-to-debt mechanism. The second is the gradual depreciation of the dollar that sustains this structure, its share in global reserves falling to 40 percent, and financial fragility becoming increasingly visible through various documents and disclosures.

The Case of Venezuela

One of the sharpest breaking points of the last year occurred in Venezuela. Developments surrounding the kidnapping of President Maduro intensified the perception that Washington is pushing the limits of the direct use of force against a sovereign state, ostensibly on the grounds of “drugs” or “order,” but in reality driven by control over natural resources. A broad segment of the international community viewed this intervention as clearly unlawful and described it as a violation of the principle of state sovereignty.

The equality of sovereign states and the prohibition of interference in domestic affairs—among the fundamental principles of international law—are protected by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The overthrow or capture of the leader of another state by military force is clearly contrary to this principle, since the legitimate use of force is not possible without a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. The critical point here is not a single country. Ultimately, the issue concerns the impact of the Venezuelan case on international norms and the principle of sovereignty.

In a system where one actor normalizes shaping domestic political outcomes through military pressure, other states may turn to similar non-normative methods. This weakens sovereignty and increases the risk that global law will be replaced by raw power politics. If great powers justify determining the political future of rivals or victims through military action, other actors will inevitably follow similar paths. This process raises the risk that the principle of sovereignty and the prohibition of the use of force between states in the international system will become negotiable. In this respect, the USA has inflicted the greatest damage on the international order. The normalization of such practices will allow power politics to take precedence over law.

While the Economy Becomes a “Weapon”

Trump’s first year also witnessed the systematic use of economic tools alongside military instruments as mechanisms of pressure and intimidation. The “America First” trade document, published at the beginning of Trump’s second term, openly declared that trade policy would be used as a tool of “national security” and “strategic pressure.” The transition of this document from theory to practice became evident over the past year through tariff increases imposed on almost every state perceived as a threat to American interests.

These sanctions evolved into measures that targeted not only bilateral relations with the USA, but also the relations of those states with third countries. As a result, the principle of sovereign equality was eroded, and international law gave way to naked power relations determining who may trade with whom. For example, on January 10, 2026, Trump announced that he would impose a 25 percent tariff on third countries trading with Iran.

As a systemic consequence, the norms of the World Trade Organization and the predictable trade order are increasingly being replaced by the “threat of the day” or the “bargain of the day.” When viewed together with the pressure applied over Greenland, this approach ties security guarantees and trade blackmail into the same package for allies. On January 17, Trump decided that tariffs initially set at 10 percent and scheduled to take effect on February 1 would be increased to 25 percent as of June 1 if European states created obstacles regarding Greenland. This mafia-style challenge will inevitably accelerate the turn of other countries toward alternative payment systems and regional trade blocs, further driving de-dollarization. Today, while the dollar’s share in global bank reserves has fallen to 40 percent, gold has exceeded the 35 percent threshold.

Pressure on Rules and Institutions

It was not only foreign policy that generated controversy during Trump’s first year; the pace and scope of executive action at home also placed the “checks and balances” mechanisms—central to the American political architecture—under constant strain. Executive orders reaching 225 in 2025 pointed to an unprecedented intensity for a first presidential year and reinforced the perception that decision-making had shifted toward a path that bypasses congressional and judicial oversight.

Although this speed was justified by the rhetoric of “effectiveness,” it deepened concerns over institutional legitimacy and predictability. The shift from merit- and career-based appointments toward loyalty-based staffing within the federal bureaucracy became increasingly visible, triggering a profound debate over the professional quality of public administration. For example, it became normalized to appoint billionaires who were former real-estate agents—and even individuals frequently mentioned in the Epstein files—instead of career diplomats to key foreign-policy roles and ambassadorial posts, including in the case of Türkiye. While rapid staffing centralized state capacity in the short term, it eroded institutional memory in the medium and long term. This process further exposed already fragile social fault lines. Political language hardened, the space for compromise narrowed, and the country was pulled into an accelerating axis of polarization. Meanwhile, as seen in the State of Minnesota, the executive’s ICE practices against immigrants created deep fractures not only in security and law, but also within the social contract itself. The methods and scope of these practices fostered local distrust and entrenched hostile psychology between opposing camps. As the gap between the abstract guarantees of law and concrete practices on the ground widened, faith in the impartiality of the state was damaged.

This erosion contributed to a dramatic decline in Trump’s credibility ratings. In this context, the harsh centralization of executive power on one hand, the rhetoric of “withdrawal” on the other, and foreign interventions that challenge international law, alliances, and friendships together normalized the contradictions experienced in Trump’s final year. This represents an unusual rupture in traditional American politics. For decades, U.S. politics functioned on a shared institutional ground despite ideological differences. That ground has eroded during Trump’s last year. Congress, the bureaucracy, alliance networks, and even the “limits of law” have increasingly been transformed into instrumental tools.

Retreat from Soft Power

The global influence of the USA in the post-1945 period was not based solely on its military and economic capacity; it also stemmed from its ability to set norms, build order, and be perceived as a reliable mediator when necessary. This power functioned through legitimacy, narrative, and institutional continuity long before the tank or the aircraft. Washington was hegemonic to the extent that it could present its own interests as universal principles. This architecture collapsed during Trump’s second term. The USA began to lose these three pillars simultaneously.

At the point reached today, the USA’s capacity to produce legitimacy has been seriously eroded. Its narrative power has weakened, and the claim of “setting an example” has been replaced by naked power politics. The withdrawal of the Trump administration at the beginning of 2026 from more than 60 UN bodies—especially UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development)—and other UN-affiliated institutions and organizations represents a turning point showing that this rupture is structural rather than symbolic. This step amounts to a declaration that the USA has effectively withdrawn from the soft-power front and settled on the hard-power front. Washington is no longer the actor that writes the rules; instead, it appears as one that reminds others of its power before sitting at the table.

It is no coincidence that throughout this one-year period the Trump line consistently described soft-power institutions as “unnecessary costs,” “inefficient spending,” and “shackles that bind the USA.” Cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, and multilateral platforms were viewed as dysfunctional in short-term interest calculations. As seen in the case of the Voice of America (VOA), the dismantling of the global narrative channels that the United States has built over decades was put on the agenda, and although these moves clashed with Congress and the judiciary, the intention was made clear. What is observed here is that the USA has abandoned the will to explain itself to the world.

The tendency to move away from multilateralism has not been limited to the UN, but has also deepened with signs that ties with platforms such as UNCTAD, where the global economic order is discussed, will be severed. This picture shows that the discourse of a “rules-based international order” has been de facto abandoned and replaced by an order based on bilateral bargaining, threat-reward balances, and asymmetric power relations. Rules have been replaced by bargaining, norms by power, and institutions by instant interest calculations.

The strategic outcome of this decline in soft power is clear. Military and economic pressure instruments are becoming more naked, more fragile, and more reactive. Hard power stripped of legitimacy generates resistance rather than deterrence. As the use of force increases, the ground that renders it acceptable becomes thinner. The U.S. sphere of influence does not expand; on the contrary, it contracts. The problem facing Washington today is not merely a lack of power, but the loss of meaning and acceptability of power itself. This shows that U.S. hegemony has entered a qualitative dissolution, not just a quantitative one.

International Law and Norm Erosion

Perhaps the most permanent and dangerous rupture of Trump’s last year occurred in the legal and normative climate. We have entered a period in which violations themselves have become commonplace, rather than debates over how rules are violated. Law is no longer a framework that draws boundaries; it has turned into an instrument that can be stretched or ignored when deemed necessary. This transformation marks a quiet yet profound regime change within the United States.

In the first months of this period, allegations of violations of international law ceased to be merely subjects of political polemics; they began to be discussed under the heading of “normalized exceptions.” The issue here is not isolated lawlessness, but the presentation of lawlessness as the new normal. As the state of exception became permanent, law receded and decision-making expanded into gray zones.

This process concentrated norm erosion along several critical lines. Concepts such as the “war on drugs,” “war on terror,” “anti-Semitism,” “migration,” and “national security” ceased to function as legal definitions and instead became elastic languages of justification legitimizing both the use of force abroad and accelerated security practices at home. As justification grew ambiguous, authority expanded; as boundaries blurred, law lost its effectiveness. The gradual detachment of military and security decisions from legal oversight, transparency, and public scrutiny evolved not only into a legal problem but into a deepening legitimacy crisis. As oversight declined, accountability weakened, and the silence of law amplified the voice of power.

Ultimately, the rules were not broken overnight; they were neutralized step by step. The cost of this erosion is not confined to today’s crises. It also prepares the ground for tomorrow’s conflicts. A world in which norms dissolve evolves into an order where those who act earlier and more ruthlessly prevail, and in such an order, no one is safe in the long run.

Finance Capital, Israeli Pressure, and Trump

The primary reason Trump was unable to resist finance capital, neocons, and Zionist pressure circles positioned against him in his first year was financial rather than ideological. He could secure the financing required to roll over massive debt stocks and gain market support only by providing guarantees demanded by these centers. These guarantees included the exploitation of resources in countries under de facto occupation or pressure (Ukraine, Venezuela, Nigeria, etc.), the opening of geopolitical spaces, and political concessions.

Within this equation, the blackmail mechanism established through the Epstein files also pushed Trump into a position with no room for maneuver. As a result, while Trump appeared domestically as a figure “against the system,” abroad he became an actor who retreated on every issue—from Gaza to Iran, from sanctions to military engagements—under Israeli pressure, unable to move beyond the boundaries drawn by Zionist finance capital and the neocon agenda. The first-year balance sheet made this unmistakably clear: Trump did not overthrow the order; the order absorbed him. The drift of the past year has been the most naked expression of this surrender.

Conclusion

The first year of Trump’s second term was recorded not as a deviation, but as a threshold at which the structural disintegration of U.S. hegemony accelerated. Trump’s election promises of introversion, balance, prudent use of force, and rapid war termination evaporated under the weight of the debt spiral, dependence on finance capital, Israel-based pressures, and neocon reflexes. The resulting picture cannot be explained by traditional conservatism or the institutional American mindset.

A governance practice in which law no longer sets boundaries, institutions are instrumentalized, and economic and military power become open tools of blackmail has been normalized. A U.S. profile has emerged that has lost its soft power, whose capacity to produce norms has eroded, and that imposes influence not through legitimacy but through fear. Annus Horribilis tells more than the story of Trump’s personal failure. It reveals that the claim of an orderly system has been abandoned and that the USA has become an actor that no longer manages the system, but coerces it through naked force. This path may grant Washington short-term pressure advantages, but in the medium and long term it produces greater resistance, deeper ruptures, and a more fragile world. In a phase where power prevails over law, the loser will not only be the USA, but the global order itself.

Türkiye Lessons

The U.S.-based establishment no longer provides a reliable reference point. It acts according to power fluctuations rather than norms and law. Therefore, Türkiye should abandon approaches that tie its security, economy, and diplomatic orientation to a single center or a reflexive “NATO alignment.” The priority must be to transform strategic autonomy into an institutional and material reality, not a nominal concept.

National defense capacity that reduces foreign dependency, a Blue Homeland-oriented posture that strengthens deterrence at sea and in the air, and decision-making mechanisms insulated from external pressure during crises are vital. In parallel, the economy and finance must be removed from being instruments of blackmail. Instead of debt-driven growth, Türkiye should pursue the goal of becoming a regional center of production, energy, and logistics, while supporting alternative payment systems through local-currency use and gold-based reserve diversification.

In foreign policy, a multidimensional, balanced, and principled line should be followed, placing Turkish geopolitics at the center without falling into either “submission to the West” or reactionary rupture. From Ukraine to the Middle East, from the Caucasus to Africa, Türkiye should employ its military power with legal legitimacy and diplomatic flexibility, strengthening its role as a mediator and regional order-builder.

Statecraft should prioritize long-term geopolitical resilience over short-term tactical gains. In a world where power is naked, Türkiye’s advantage lies in being one of the rare countries capable of balancing power with law, geography, and reason. In this context, Türkiye must oppose under all circumstances the formation of a Kurdish autonomous region in Syria with access to the sea; prevent faits accomplis in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean that contradict Blue Homeland interests; and resist the imposition of a federal solution in the TRNC, not only externally but also within the TRNC itself. The TRNC is not merely an issue of Turkish Cypriots; it is the concern of every Turkish citizen, from the nomads of the Taurus Mountains to the farmers of Thrace.

The force seeking to pit Türkiye and Russia against each other in the Black Sea is the globalist finance-capital structure within the neocon and Zionist sphere of influence. Türkiye must resist this structure, despite its economic dependencies, and clearly explain to its people the geopolitical consequences of such resistance. Otherwise, despite having no national interest, Türkiye may find itself deploying F-16s to the Baltic Air Policing mission or sending the TCG Anadolu task group—one of our most valuable assets—to the North Atlantic and Baltic Seas for NATO interests, precisely at a moment when the Greek Foreign Minister has openly declared the intention to extend territorial waters to 12 miles in the Aegean.

The magnitude of the risk posed by both missions—thousands of miles from our borders—of escalating armed conflict between Türkiye and Russia is beyond explanation. Given the current regional conjuncture, including increasing Ukrainian attacks on shipping in the Black Sea, rising tensions with Israel in Syria, Greece’s recent statements, and NATO’s crisis of purpose triggered by the Greenland issue, it is necessary for NATO to cancel these missions and for Türkiye to bring the allocated forces back under full national control.

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This article was originally published on Mavi Vatan.

Ret Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Writer, Geopolitical Expert, Theorist and creator of the Turkish Bluehomeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. He served as the Chief of Strategy Department and then the head of Plans and Policy Division in Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters. As his combat duties, he has served as the commander of Amphibious Ships Group and Mine Fleet between 2007 and 2009. He retired in 2012. He established Hamit Naci Blue Homeland Foundation in 2021. He has published numerous books on geopolitics, maritime strategy, maritime history and maritime culture. He is also a honorary member of ATASAM. 

He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Featured image is from the author

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